On 1 June 2026, Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee led the first mission to Central Asia by a Hong Kong leader, signing 96 cooperation documents in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan worth more than US$1.65 billion. The five-day trip targeted green finance, logistics, aviation and technology, with 39 deals signed in Kazakhstan and 57 in Uzbekistan.
The figure dwarfs current trade, which sat below 0.1% of Hong Kong’s external total in 2023. Whether the memorandums become bankable assets will decide if this is diversification or theatre.
The headline number is US$1.65 billion. The number that argues with it is HK$1.97 billion — Hong Kong’s entire merchandise trade with Kazakhstan in 2023.
That gap is the whole story. A single delegation, in five days, signed agreements worth more than two years of existing trade with both countries combined. John Lee Ka-chiu led the first Central Asian mission by a Hong Kong Chief Executive, returning on 5 June 2026 with 96 cooperation documents and a pitch: Hong Kong as the financial gateway between Central Asia and East Asia.
The official framing is economic diversification. Hong Kong, the argument goes, is opening fresh markets along the Belt and Road corridor. The quieter reading is that a financial centre under Western scrutiny is looking for room to grow where that scrutiny does not reach. Both readings can be true. The question is which one the deals turn out to be — and the answer sits in whether any of these memorandums ever priced a bond.
The deals are large; the base is tiny
Start with the split. Kazakhstan accounted for 39 of the signed documents, Uzbekistan 57, for a combined stated value above US$1.65 billion. The sectors named were green finance, logistics, aviation and innovation — the areas where Hong Kong sells expertise rather than goods.
Set that against the trade base. Hong Kong government data put 2023 trade with Uzbekistan at just HK$0.63 billion. Both countries together made up less than 0.1% of Hong Kong’s external trade that year. The agreements are not built on existing flows. They are a bet on flows that do not yet exist.
Lee made the pitch concrete in Astana. He told counterparts that Hong Kong could supply fundraising, risk management and green finance for Belt and Road infrastructure and energy projects. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed Hong Kong firms into transport, logistics and the digital economy, pointing to the Astana International Financial Centre as the natural bridge.
The interest is not one-sided. Margaret Fong, executive director of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, has argued that Central Asia’s diversification and infrastructure needs make these economies natural partners for Hong Kong’s strengths in finance and professional services. The structures matter as much as the sectors.
What the table cannot show is whether the legal plumbing exists to make any of this work. That is where the framework, not the figure, decides the outcome.
| Jurisdiction | Current rule | New mechanism | Effective basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong | Separate customs territory under Article 116 of the Basic Law | Direct MOUs between HKMA, SFC and Central Asian regulators | Basic Law, in force |
| Kazakhstan | AIFC operates a common-law regime with independent courts | Cross-listing and green-finance alignment with Hong Kong | AIFC framework, active |
| Uzbekistan | Gradual capital-market reform; thin exchange turnover | Hong Kong as platform to attract FDI and exports | Bilateral MOUs, June 2026 |
The Basic Law is the real product
Hong Kong’s pitch is not capital. It is law. Under Article 116 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong is a separate customs territory able to sign its own trade and investment deals. That is why a Chinese city can sign 96 documents with two sovereign states without Beijing in the room.
The mechanics follow from that status. Deals can be structured under Hong Kong law, run through special-purpose vehicles based there, with disputes heard in Hong Kong courts or its arbitration centres. The legal regimes also fit. The AIFC runs on a common-law base with independent courts, the same family of law that Hong Kong offers. Niva Yau, a senior researcher at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and an Atlantic Council fellow, has noted that this adds dispute-resolution and intermediation skills the mainland’s hubs cannot always supply.
So the diversification framing was always half the picture. The mainland’s policy banks are pulling back, and direct Chinese lending draws harder scrutiny each year. Hong Kong supplies a way to keep Belt and Road projects financed using market money and a legal system the West already trusts. That is the answer to the opening question. This is not a retreat from Western pressure or a clean break for new markets. It is Beijing routing capital around the pressure, through the one door still marked common law.
Beyond the headline
The bigger picture
Hong Kong’s Central Asia push fits a broader pattern of Asian financial centres competing to intermediate Belt and Road capital as Western regulators scrutinise China-linked deals more closely. Rather than simply chasing new markets, Hong Kong is vying with Singapore, Dubai and the AIFC itself to become the default structuring venue for Eurasian infrastructure, energy transition and logistics assets.
The power behind it
Although the trip is framed as Hong Kong deepening its own external ties, the real gravitational force is Beijing’s desire to sustain the Belt and Road with more market-based funding. Hong Kong’s common-law system, dollar cash base and listing venues give China a flexible tool to keep Central Asian projects financed while official policy banks retrench and scrutiny of direct Chinese lending intensifies.
What isn’t being said
Absent from official statements is how political risk shapes Western participation. Sanctions on Russia, governance concerns and tighter compliance around China-related exposure mean many global banks and asset managers will demand robust transparency and legal safeguards before following Hong Kong into Central Asian deals. Whether those guardrails get built will decide if this pivot draws broad-based capital or stays largely intra-Asian.
What to track before the first bond prices
With the memorandums signed but not yet funded, the next 18 months will show whether the US$1.65 billion figure is real money or a press release. Here is what each reader should watch.
- Institutional investors
Track announcements from the Astana International Financial Centre on new green or infrastructure bond listings, especially those citing Hong Kong arrangers or Hong Kong law. The AIFC’s own data show roughly US$10 billion in assets under management by end-2024 — a base small enough that a single Hong Kong-arranged deal would move it visibly.
- Frontier-market fund holders
You may already hold Kazakh banking and mining names through frontier ETFs. Watch listed logistics and rail operators on the Trans-Caspian route for pipeline news. The first deal explicitly referencing these MOUs is the signal that exposure is widening, not the headline figure itself.
- Trade and corporate finance teams
Benchmark the current scale first. Review Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department data on flows with both countries before any structured projects come onstream. Hong Kong’s role as Central Asia’s privatisation intermediary — including a planned Kazakh state railway listing in Hong Kong — gives a clearer read on substance than the MOU count.
Explainer
- Belt and Road
- China’s flagship plan to build trade and infrastructure links across Eurasia, launched in 2013. It spans overland corridors through Central Asia and maritime routes through Southeast Asia, funded largely by Chinese policy banks. Hong Kong’s new role aims to add market-based funding as those state banks pull back and direct Chinese lending faces tighter scrutiny abroad.
- Astana International Financial Centre
- Kazakhstan’s financial hub in Astana, operating under a common-law legal regime with independent courts and arbitration. By end-2024 it hosted over 2,000 companies from more than 80 countries, with fintech among its fastest-growing sectors. Its common-law base is what makes cross-listing and dispute resolution with Hong Kong legally straightforward.
- Basic Law
- Hong Kong’s constitutional document under Chinese sovereignty, in force since 1997. Article 116 designates Hong Kong a separate customs territory able to sign its own trade and investment agreements with foreign states. This authority let Hong Kong conclude 96 documents with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan without Beijing as a formal signatory.
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