US President Donald Trump will meet leaders from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and other Middle Eastern states at the G7 summit in France from June 15 to 17, to discuss a proposed Iran deal and the demining of the Strait of Hormuz. A senior US administration official confirmed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not expected to take part in those meetings, calling the emerging Iran arrangement “a strong deal.”
Netanyahu is subject to an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, and France is bound by treaty to act on it. The leader most invested in confronting Iran is now absent from the room where Iran’s future is being decided.
Washington has built its Middle East policy around Israel for the better part of fifty years. The pattern is so durable that its absence reads as the news. Trump is pursuing his largest Iran deal yet, and the Israeli prime minister has not been asked to the table.
A senior US administration official confirmed that Netanyahu will not join Trump’s meetings with Gulf and Arab leaders at the G7. The talks, the official said, aim to close out the conflict with Iran and plan the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Israel, the country that has done the most to bring the confrontation to this point, is being kept outside the negotiation entirely.
This is not a scheduling accident. It is a position. And it tells you more about where US strategy is heading than any communiqué the summit will produce.
A deal built without the country that started the fight
The official’s language was unusually direct. “We think we have an Iran deal. It’s a strong deal,” the senior administration figure said. On demining, the message was the same: the US would lead operations once the strait reopens, with Britain and France possibly contributing naval assets.
The optimism is not confined to Washington. Pakistan announced on June 13 that an agreement to end the war was closer than “ever before,” suggesting it could be finalised within 24 hours. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi posted on X that a deal “has never been closer.” Tehran, more careful, signalled no signing on Sunday but left the coming days open.
Read the guest list closely and the design becomes clear. Trump is also slated to meet leaders from Egypt, France, India and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and to dine with Emmanuel Macron at Versailles. Netanyahu fits nowhere on that itinerary. The tension between the two men has been building, with Trump pressing Israel to soften its response to attacks from Iran and Hezbollah.
The warrant did the work the diplomacy could not say out loud
Two separate constraints are doing the work here, and they should not be confused. The ICC warrant for Netanyahu, issued under the Rome Statute, legally obliges France to make an arrest on its soil. That is binding law, not a political choice. It makes any in-person summit appearance on French ground a legal crisis waiting to happen.
The Iran and Hormuz decisions are different in kind. They are politically binding but carry no treaty force. Implementation runs through national sanctions rules, defence agreements and naval rules of engagement, which leaves leaders wide room to commit deeply or barely at all.
That distinction matters for what comes next. For Western governments and firms, a deal that restores safe passage through Hormuz would quickly lower shipping insurance costs and rerouting bills for Europe- and Asia-bound crude and gas. It would weaken the case for emergency stockpile releases and costly naval deployments. Netanyahu’s absence, conveniently, lets European capitals engage Iran without a public fight with Israel’s government in the same week.
The structural condition has not changed: the US still sets the terms of Middle East security. What has changed is who it sets them with. The leader who built his career on confronting Iran is now watching that confrontation be resolved without him.
Beyond the headline
The power behind it
The real leverage sits less with the public figures and more with the officials who control sanctions and insurance exposure. US and EU treasury and foreign ministries, alongside London and continental reinsurers, decide how fast Iranian cargoes become insurable and bankable again. That quiet financial plumbing will determine whether any deal changes regional reality or stays a gesture.
The timing
These moves are happening because the Hormuz disruption has collided with hard political calendars. Washington is running short of patience over energy prices ahead of its own electoral pressures, and European leaders need a visible Middle East win before facing voters and coalition partners. That compressed timetable makes a rapid, improvised framework far more likely than a carefully verified agreement.
The regional split
The guest list shows an emerging divide. Gulf partners and Egypt are ready to trade quiet coordination for security and economic stability; an isolated Israeli leadership faces legal scrutiny abroad. That divergence suggests future US initiatives may be designed around a core group that can meet comfortably in European venues, without the baggage Netanyahu now carries.
Reading the next two weeks correctly
With the summit running June 15 to 17 and an Iran deal described as days away, the signals to track are concrete and time-bound.
- Energy and shipping firms
Do not normalise traffic on a declaration alone. Watch flag-state guidance, port authority notices and marine insurer updates before routing crude or LNG through Hormuz. Commercial safety usually lags diplomatic announcements by weeks, sometimes months.
- Compliance and legal teams
An Iran arrangement will modify, not erase, US and EU sanctions. Track regulatory updates from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and EU Council regulations before adjusting controls. Until implementing rules are published, maintaining current restrictions remains the prudent call.
- Diplomatic and policy watchers
Monitor the International Criminal Court for updates on state-party cooperation and enforcement practice. How strictly European governments treat visits by warrant-holders will tell you how far Netanyahu’s isolation extends beyond this single summit.
FAQ
What are the real travel risks for Netanyahu to Rome Statute states?
Under the Rome Statute, ratifying states are formally obliged to execute ICC arrest warrants on their territory. Enforcement has varied in practice, but travel to EU countries, including France, carries a genuine risk of arrest or a serious diplomatic standoff. Governments often manage this through downgraded visits, neutral venues, or by avoiding in-person attendance altogether.
How exposed are businesses to a partial Hormuz reopening?
Even with a ceasefire announced, shipowners and commodity traders will watch how quickly naval escorts, demining and insurance underwriting adjust before resuming normal traffic. Firms typically rely on updated guidance from flag states, port authorities and marine insurers to judge when routes are truly safe. Commercial decisions may therefore lag diplomatic declarations by weeks or months.
How could an Iran deal change sanctions compliance?
A new arrangement is likely to modify rather than remove existing US and EU sanctions. Companies will need to follow regulatory updates from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and EU Council regulations to learn which sectors or entities become newly licit. Until implementing regulations are published, most compliance officers will advise keeping current restrictions in place.
Explainer
- Strait of Hormuz
- The narrow sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, and one of the world’s most important oil and gas chokepoints. Roughly a fifth of global petroleum trade passes through it, which is why disruption there moves prices worldwide. The current crisis has seen Iranian ports blockaded by the US and traffic through the strait severely curtailed, making any demining plan a direct lever on global energy supply.
- Rome Statute
- The 1998 treaty that established the International Criminal Court and defines the crimes it can prosecute. Its more than 120 state parties, including France, are legally bound to arrest individuals subject to ICC warrants on their territory. That obligation is what turns Netanyahu’s warrant from a symbolic gesture into a practical barrier to attending summits on French soil.
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