Panetta warns US risks forever war over Hormuz control

Former CIA Director Leon Panetta warned on Thursday that the United States is being drawn into a “forever war” with Iran because the administration’s implicit strategy—gaining control of the Strait of Hormuz—would require military operations that carry heavy casualties and no clear endpoint.

About 20% of global oil transits the narrow waterway, but international law and naval realities make dominating it an escalatory gamble. Panetta’s public intervention is the starkest indictment yet of a policy that he says offers only two paths: indefinite tit‑for‑tat strikes or a large‑scale campaign the American public is not prepared for.

Leon Panetta did not warn against renewed war on Thursday. He warned against the only strategy that could end it. Control of the Strait of Hormuz—the waterway that carries a fifth of the world’s crude oil—is, in his reading, the indispensable condition for any durable ceasefire with Tehran. It is also the trigger for a confrontation that would dwarf the airstrikes of the past 48 hours.

Since Wednesday evening, US jets have struck Iranian air‑defence, coastal surveillance, and missile sites near Bandar Abbas, Bandar Sirik, and Qeshm Island. Iran’s Quds Force has answered with salvos against American bases in Iraq and Syria. The exchanges already look routine. What troubled Panetta was the destination they signal.

“The worst elements of a forever war,” he called it, a pattern of mutual retaliation that has no off‑ramp without a decision Washington has so far avoided: whether to seize the strait itself. That choice, he made plain, would involve military action and casualties the administration has not publicly acknowledged.

The chokepoint that sets the price of peace

Roughly one‑fifth of global crude and condensate shipments passes through the Strait of Hormuz every year, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The figure is the most important number in the crisis—and the reason a 39‑kilometre‑wide passage between Oman and Iran has been a latent flashpoint since the 1980s.

Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the strait is an international waterway where all ships enjoy transit passage. No single state holds legal title to close or control it unilaterally. Yet the US Navy’s long‑standing Freedom of Navigation Operations program routinely challenges what Washington calls “excessive maritime claims,” and any bid to govern traffic flows directly would sit uneasily with that same legal architecture.

Panetta’s argument is that the logic of the present campaign leads inexorably toward physical control. “As long as Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz,” he said, “a ceasefire or resolution of the issues will not be possible.” But control in this theater means something closer to naval dominance than legal authority—a posture that requires sustained carrier presence and, almost certainly, strikes on Iranian anti‑ship batteries and early‑warning installations on the northern shore.

Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, a senior research fellow at RUSI, notes that the strait is Iran’s most powerful deterrent. Any American effort to wrest that lever away would be “exceptionally risky and escalatory,” she observes, because Tehran can expand the battlefield through proxy networks in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen while absorbing tactical losses that Washington would find politically unsustainable. That is the honest caveat hanging over Panetta’s own prescription.

A quiet assessment from EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell underscored the spillover risk: any miscalculation in the strait would hit European energy prices immediately, squeezing refiners and their governments at a precarious economic moment. Meanwhile, Vice President JD Vance confirmed that technical talks in Doha based on a 14‑point memorandum had taken place, but described the framework as “fraying.”

What is missing from public discussion is the precise mechanism that ties the tactical strikes to a strategic endgame. The strikes are described as limited efforts to degrade Iran’s capacity to threaten shipping. But if degrading that capacity is the goal, then a campaign that stops short of controlling the strait leaves the threat intact. That tension—between stated limits and implied objective—is the one Panetta made impossible to ignore.

The law that makes possession impossible

The Strait of Hormuz is not a piece of territory. It is a corridor where international law and naval power intersect awkwardly. UNCLOS guarantees transit passage for all vessels, and the United States has spent decades reinforcing that principle through Freedom of Navigation Operations. Any move to physically dominate the strait would therefore operate in a legal vacuum, relying on raw sea‑control doctrine rather than recognised sovereignty.

That makes the task both simpler and harder. Simpler because the US already deploys carrier strike groups in the region and could, in theory, enforce a cordon. Harder because anything short of fully neutralising Iran’s coastal defences invites a constant, low‑grade exchange that would lock American sailors into a shooting gallery. The 1987‑1988 tanker war showed how quickly a protective mission can escalate into direct confrontation; an accidental collision between US and Iranian forces nearly triggered a wider conflict then, and the operational environment is far denser now.

For Western economies, the compounding costs are already accumulating. A sustained closure or near‑closure of the strait would not only raise headline crude prices but also spike tanker insurance premiums, freight rates, and hedging costs for energy‑intensive industries across Europe. European refiners competing for diverted cargoes would face supply squeezes, while US and UK naval budgets would be stretched between the Gulf, Europe, and the Indo‑Pacific. One unspoken consequence is that assets needed to deter China in the South China Sea would, in any prolonged Hormuz campaign, quietly move west.

Washington last faced this arithmetic in 1987. It concluded that protecting shipping required a full carrier battle group and, ultimately, a tragic accident that nearly widened the war. It is being asked to make that calculation again—only now the administration has not said publicly whether it will.

Beyond the headline

The Power Behind It

The struggle is less about tactical strikes and more about who sets the rules of regional order in the Gulf. Washington is trying to preserve a U.S.‑led security architecture built around open sea lanes, while Tehran seeks a sphere of influence where its missile and proxy networks deter outside intervention. Panetta’s warning exposes how that deeper contest, not just the latest skirmish, is driving choices on both sides.

The Timing

Panetta’s intervention lands just as the Islamabad Memorandum framework is fraying and tit‑for‑tat strikes risk becoming routine rather than exceptional. This moment matters because once markets, militaries, and publics adjust to a normalized low‑grade war around Hormuz, reversing that equilibrium typically requires either a major shock or a deliberate diplomatic reset — neither of which is yet visible.

What Isn’t Being Said

Public debate focuses on oil prices and deterrence but not on how a campaign to dominate Hormuz would strain already stretched U.S. forces across Europe and the Indo‑Pacific. Quietly, planners would have to re‑prioritise carriers, submarines, and surveillance assets away from China‑focused missions, reshaping Washington’s global posture in ways that could outlast any eventual ceasefire with Tehran.

Why Hormuz is now a betting market

With the suspension of the Islamabad Memorandum and naval forces massing, three groups face immediate calculations.

• Energy market investors

  Review the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s World Oil Transit Chokepoints analysis. The 20% transit figure alone implies that any sustained Hormuz disruption would add a structurally elevated risk premium to crude benchmarks; watch for further OPEC+ production increases as a fragile buffer.

• Business travelers and expatriates

  Check the latest security advisories for Iran and Gulf states on your national foreign ministry’s portal (the UK’s FCDO is one reliable entry point). Have contingency plans for sudden airport closures or shipping delays along the Gulf littoral.

• Defense and policy analysts

  Monitor the status of the Doha technical talks and any formal announcement on resuming the Islamabad Memorandum. A breakdown would likely trigger a redeployment of U.S. naval assets that will shift regional balances elsewhere, including the Indo‑Pacific, within weeks.

Explainer

Strait of Hormuz

The narrow waterway between Oman and Iran connecting the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. Roughly 20% of global crude oil transits the strait annually, making it the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. International law recognises the strait as an international waterway where ships of all nations enjoy the right of transit passage.

UNCLOS

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is the primary treaty governing ocean use, including the regime of transit passage through international straits. While the United States has not ratified the convention, it treats many of its provisions, such as free navigation through straits, as customary international law.

Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)

A U.S. Department of Defense program that sends naval vessels through waters where coastal states are perceived to be making excessive maritime claims. The practical aim is to reinforce the right of transit passage and to demonstrate that no single country can unilaterally restrict access to an international strait like Hormuz.

Islamabad Memorandum

A 14‑point framework agreed between U.S. and Iranian representatives, named after the host city where initial talks took place. It established technical working groups on nuclear constraints, missile programs, and Strait of Hormuz security. The memorandum was suspended in July 2026 after renewed attacks on commercial vessels.

Transit passage

A legal right under UNCLOS that permits ships and aircraft to pass through international straits without interference from coastal states. Unlike innocent passage, transit passage cannot be suspended and allows submarines to remain submerged. It applies fully to the Strait of Hormuz regardless of any coastal state claims.